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I. INTRODUCTION
Florida has remained in the forefront of developments in criminal law
and procedure, and in many respects serves as an incubator for new
approaches and ideas which facilitate the operation of our criminal justice
system. With a Florida Constitution that provides protections in addition to
those guarantees secured by the Bill of Rights, the Florida Supreme Court
has not hesitated to utilize Florida law to promote individual freedoms.
Under the leadership of Chief Justice Rosemary Barkett,' the Florida
Supreme Court continues to follow a judicial philosophy of recognizing the
rights of both victims and defendants, promoting fairness in the relationship
I. As the people of the State of Florida applaud the tremendous leadership of Chief
Justice Rosemary Barkett, practitioners should note with both sadness and exhilaration that
the Chief Justice will be leaving the Florida court system to become a Circuit Judge of the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. She will, no doubt, carry her insight, concerns, and
leadership to the federal bench.
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between prosecution and defense, and looking beyond the technical
requirements of the law to restore meaning to the justice system.
This article surveys Florida criminal law and procedural developments
which occurred between September 1992 and September 1993. While the
primary focus of this survey is an exploration of the pronouncements of the
Florida Supreme Court, developments in the Florida Legislature and the
district courts of appeal are analyzed as deemed necessary. The approach
used throughout this article highlights important developments, analyzes
legal precedent, and suggests future issues of concern for the criminal law
practitioner. Although specialized issues which arise in capital and death
penalty litigation are not included in this survey, the article is otherwise
comprehensive.
During the past year, as Florida saw the continued growth of crime and
the apparent lack of resources to control that escalation, the Florida
Legislature made a serious effort to promote an effective and fiscally
responsible criminal justice system. The result was the enactment of a
comprehensive new criminal justice package known as the Safe Streets
Initiative of 1994,2 which revised the sentencing guidelines to emphasize
incarceration in state prison for violent and repeat offenders, and to utilize
alternatives to incarceration for nonviolent and first time defendants. The
Legislature also overhauled the control release laws, authorized the develop-
ment of circuit pretrial intervention programs, revised DUI laws by lowering
the blood alcohol level necessary for a conviction, and even added a change
of venue law known as the "Lozano venue bill" in response to the highly
charged debate about relocating high profile trials.
Juvenilejustice issues also received substantial attention from the courts
and the legislature. Law enforcement received authorization to release the
names of juvenile offenders adjudicated guilty of certain offenses. Using or
carrying weapons at bus stops and on school buses was prohibited, perhaps
a surprise to all those who thought this was already illegal. With an eye
toward promoting meaningful rehabilitation, the juvenile justice bill
mandated comprehensive, community-based juvenile programs and services,
and authorized pretrial intervention for certain juvenile crimes.
No survey of Florida criminal law and procedural developments for the
past year would be complete without recognizing that the Florida justice
system has responded to a number of unexpected crises this year. Images
of just another fall season, suitable for watching sports on television or
getting the children ready for school, were blown away with the unwel-
2. Ch. 93-406, 1993 Fla. Laws 2911.
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comed arrival of Hurricane Andrew on August 24, 1992. The first order of
business for the Florida Supreme Court was to ensure the normal operation
of the justice system in South Florida. On September 2, 1992, responding
to a request by the Dade County State Attorney, the supreme court issued
an order tolling "all time limits authorized by rule and statute affecting the
speedy trial procedure in criminal and juvenile procedure" in Dade County
for the two weeks after Hurricane Andrew.3 The court also acknowledged
that Hurricane Andrew's impact extended well beyond Dade County, and
accordingly permitted a tolling of time limits in situations "where a party
demonstrates that the lack of compliance with the requisite time periods was
attributable to Hurricane Andrew."4
At the same time, the supreme court took action to protect the
operation of our democratic form of government by approving a delay of the
primary election in Dade County for one week because voters were still
recovering from the damages caused by Hurricane Andrew.' Both of these
unprecedented decisions demonstrate the willingness of the Florida Supreme
Court to utilize its considerable power to protect the people of the State of
Florida, a philosophy which is evident in many of the court's decisions.
II. SENTENCING
Because both the Florida Legislature and the courts expended
considerable effort on sentencing law and corrections policy, we begin our
examination of Florida law with that perspective.
A. Legislative Enactments
The 1993 legislative session was, in large measure, a response to the
public outcry over an escalating crime rate. The legislative result was a
unique balance of the expected "tough on crime" approach with the
recognition that available resources must be used efficiently to address our
most pressing needs. The final legislative solutions dealt harshly with
violent crimes, enhanced existing offense classifications, mandated
sentencing violent offenders to longer prison sentences, approved building
more prison beds, and created new criminal offenses. The most anticipated
3. In re Emergency Petition to Extend Time Periods Under All Florida Rules of
Procedure, 17 Fla. L. Weekly S578 (Fla. Sept. 2, 1992).
4. Id. at S579.
5. State v. Dade County, 17 Fla. L. Weekly S578 (Fla. Aug. 31, 1992).
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change, however, was the wholesale revision of the sentencing guidelines
and the elimination of many minimum mandatory sentences.
1. Sentencing Guidelines Revision
The Florida Legislature designated the 1994 revision of the sentencing
guidelines as the "Safe Streets Initiative of 1994."6 It is one of the most
comprehensive and sweeping revisions of sentencing law and policy in
recent memory. The new guidelines are designed to emphasize incarceration
in the state prison system for violent offenders and nonviolent offenders
who have repeatedly committed criminal offenses and who have demonstrat-
ed an inability to comply with the less restrictive penalties previously
imposed. The new law pays close attention to prison population limitations
and requires that any legislation which creates a felony, enhances a
misdemeanor offense to a felony, moves a felony from a lesser offense
severity level to a higher offense severity level, or reclassifies an existing
felony offense to a greater felony classification, provide that such change
results in a net zero sum impact in the overall prison population.7 The zero
impact may be avoided if the legislation contains a funding source sufficient
to accommodate the change, or by the adoption of a statutory provision
which specifically abrogates the application of this requirement.8
The revised guidelines, effective January 1, 1994, are no longer
procedural rules, but are contained in the statutes. 9 They are intended to
eliminate unwarranted disparity. They mandate the imposition of sentences
within the guidelines, unless the court orders a departure within written
guidelines. If a recommended sentence within the guidelines exceeds the
maximum sentence otherwise authorized by law, the guidelines sentence
must be imposed absent a departure. ° The court can order a departure
sentence above or below the guidelines when sufficient statutory factors are
proved by a preponderance of the evidence." The extent of a departure
is not reviewable.12
6. Ch. 93-406, 1993 Fla. Laws 2911.
7. Id. § 5, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2917 (amending FLA. STAT. § 921.001 (Supp. 1992)).
8. Id.
9. Id. § 5, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2920 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 921.001). The
Sentencing Guidelines Commission is required to prepare, adopt, and submit to the Florida
Supreme Court for approval, procedures for implementing the revised guidelines.
10. Id. § 5, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2920 (amending FLA. STAT. § 921.001(5) (Supp. 1992)).
11. Ch. 93-406, § 13, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2941 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §
921.0016).
12. Id. § 5. 1993 Fla. Laws at 2920 (amending FLA. STAT. § 921.001(5) (Supp. 1992)).
1993l
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The revised sentencing guidelines now group offenses into levels
contained in an offense severity ranking chart.' 3 This chart is used to
compute a sentence score, as opposed to the nine separate offense categories
utilized under the existing sentencing guidelines. The ranking has ten levels,
with "ten" being the most severe.' 4 Each crime is assigned a level based
on offense severity. 5 This ranking system allows greater flexibility in
revising the recommended sentence because it allows individual offenses to
be moved to another level without changing the punishment for other
offenses. Prior offenses are now weighed according to their assigned
severity, and are no longer a function of the category of the primary offense.
A major provision of the Safe Streets Initiative is the repeal of
numerous minimum mandatory sentences, including the three-year minimum
mandatory for purchase and possession of a controlled substance with intent
to purchase or sell within 1,000 feet of a school, 6 some of the minimum
mandatories for drug trafficking," the minimum mandatories for violent
offenses against law enforcement officers and related personnel, 8 as well
as the three-year minimum mandatory for an assault or battery on a person
sixty-five years of age or older,"' among others. Some minimum mandato-
ry penalties have been retained, including the minimum mandatories for
possession of firearms during the commission of certain felonies,2" the
three-year minimum mandatory for sale of drugs within 1,000 feet of a
school, 2' and the fifteen and twenty-five year minimum mandatories for
trafficking in controlled substances.22
Another substantial statutory change is the deletion of language which
prohibited eligibility for parole or control release for certain drug offenses.
Control release eligibility has been expanded, and with regard to drug
defendants establishes an order of priority, beginning with minimum
mandatory sentences, followed by habitualized offenders whose primary
offense at conviction was not burglary, and then a consideration of habitual
offenders whose primary offense was burglary. The Control Release
13. Id. § 10, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2925 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 921.0012).
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Ch. 93-406, § 23, 1993 Fla. Laws 2911, 2949 (amending FLA. STAT. § 893.13
(1991)).
17. FLA. STAT. § 893.135 (1991).
18. Id. § 775.0823.
19. Id. § 784.08.
20. Id. § 775.087.
21. Id. § 893.13.
22. FLA. STAT. § 893.135 (1991).
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Authority is mandated to maintain the state prison population at or below
97.5% to 99%, and establishes responsibilities for the Secretary of the
Department of Corrections and the Chair of the Parole Commission when
the state prison population exceeds 99.5% of lawful capacity.23 Basic gain
time is abolished for all offenses committed on or after January 1, 1994,
while incentive gain time has been expanded.24
Another revision designed to reduce the prison population permits a
sentencing court to place a defendant, whose presumptive guideline sentence
is up to twenty-two months imprisonment, in a local jail as a condition of
probation or community control for offense categories five through nine. 5
The Legislature also expanded the definition of criminal restitution,
permitted restitution orders to bear interest at 12%, to become liens as on
real estate and continue for twenty years if not paid, and exempted
restitution orders from discharge in bankruptcy.26
2. Habitual Offenders
The operation of the habitual offender statute received legislative
attention, due in part to increased concern that the statute was not being
utilized against appropriate defendants and that the statute was being
disproportionately applied against black offenders. The statute has been
changed to prohibit habitual offender treatment if the felony for which the
defendant is being sentenced, or one of the two prior felony convictions, is
the purchase or possession of drugs.27 Also, prosecuting attorneys are now
required to adopt uniform criteria for seeking habitual offender sentencing,
with a case file explanation required for all deviations. 2 Deviations from
the criteria are not subject to appellate review.29
23. Ch. 93-406, § 27, 1993 Fla. Laws 2911, 2960 (amending FLA. STAT. § 947.146
(Supp. 1992)).
24. Id. § :26, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2958 (amending FLA. STAT. § 944.275 (1991)).
25. Id. § 36, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2967 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 921.188).
26. Ch. 93-37, § I, 1993 Fla. Laws 198 (amending FLA. STAT. § 775.089 (Supp. 1992)).
27. Ch. 9:3-406, § 2, 1993 Fla. Laws 2911, 2913 (amending FLA. STAT. § 775.084
(1991)).
28. Id § 3, 1993 Fla. Laws at 2915 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 775.08401).
29. Id.
1993]
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B. Sentencing Guidelines
1. Single Scoresheet
Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.701(d)(1) requires that "[o]ne
guideline scoresheet shall be utilized for each defendant covering all
offenses pending before the court for sentencing. '30  The guidelines
provide that a particular scoresheet must be used in the case of specific
offenses, with category one used in all cases of murder or manslaughter
except first degree murder and alcohol-related manslaughter charges,3'
while a category nine scoresheet is used for any felony not otherwise
contained in any category. 32 The guidelines do not specify what scoresheet
to use for the offense of solicitation of murder. The court addressed this
issue in Hayles v. State.33 The defendant in Hayles claimed that because
inchoate offenses, e.g., conspiracy and solicitation, are included within the
category of the offense attempted, solicited, or conspired to,34 a category
nine scoresheet should have been used for his sentencing, since category one
does not apply to first degree murder. 35  The supreme court disagreed,
finding that solicitation to commit first degree murder requires use of a
category one scoresheet for sentencing guidelines purposes, since the
"solicitation was intended to effectuate a murder here, and so [the defen-
dant] falls under category one of the guidelines. 36
2. Departure Sentences
During the survey period, the Florida Supreme Court announced several
decisions which analyzed the propriety of departure sentences. The court
adhered to prior decisions in holding that "advance planning and premedita-
tion are permissible reasons for a departure in the context of sexual
battery."37 In evaluating this ground for departure, the court explained that
because premeditation and advance planning are not inherent components
of the sexual battery offense, these factors constitute departure grounds in
a sexual battery case if they are of a "heightened variety," which "consists
30. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(d)(1).
31. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(c).
32. Id.
33. 608 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1992).
34. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.701(c) (Comm. Note).
35. Hayles, 608 So. 2d at 14.
36. Id.
37. State v. Obojes, 604 So. 2d 474, 475 (Fla. 1992).
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of a careful plan or prearranged design formulated with cold fore-
thought."3 The court carefully limited its holding to sexual offenses, and
stressed "that heightened premeditation never can be a reason for departure
in cases that inherently involve cold forethought, such as conspiracy or drug
trafficking cases. ' 39
The temporal proximity of a defendant's crimes does not, by itself,
provide a valid reason for departure from the sentencing guidelines without
a finding of a persistent pattern of criminal conduct.4" A defendant's
efforts to cover up a crime do not constitute proper grounds for a departure
from the sentencing guidelines.41
C. Habitual Offender Sentences
The habitual offender law was designed "to allow enhanced penalties
for those defendants who meet objective guidelines indicating recidi-
vism."42  In determining whether a defendant satisfies the criteria for
habitual felony offender sentencing, the trial court must find by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that the defendant qualifies as an habitual felony
offender.43 It is the defendant's burden to assert a pardon or to set aside a
prior conviction as an affirmative defense.4 When the state introduces
copies of the defendant's prior convictions and the defendant concedes the
validity of the convictions, the trial court's failure to make an express
finding that the prior convictions were not pardoned or set aside constitutes
harmless error.45 The habitual offender classification is permitted where
the predicate offense for which the defendant was convicted occurred after
the commission of the offense for which the defendant is being sen-
tenced.46
Although the state is required to provide notice of its intention to have
the defendant sentenced as an habitual offender,47 the purpose of the
38. Id.
39. Id
40. Cave v. State, 613 So. 2d 454, 455 (Fla. 1993).
41. State v. Varner, 616 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1993); Smith v. State, 620 So. 2d 187 (Fla.
1993).
42. Eutsey v. State, 383 So. 2d 219, 223 (Fla. 1980).
43. Id. at 224.
44. Id. at 223.
45. State v. Rucker, 613 So. 2d 460, 462 (Fla. 1993); State v. Anderson, 613 So. 2d
465, 465 (Fla. 1993).
46. Perkowski v. State, 616 So. 2d 26 (Fla. 1993).
47. FLA. STAT. § 775.084(3)(b) (1991).
1993]
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requirement of prior notice "is to advise of the state's intent and give the
defendant and the defendant's attorney an opportunity to prepare for the
hearing."4  Where the state fails to provide advance notice, but the
defendant and counsel had actual notice in time to prepare for the sentencing
hearing, the failure of the state to provide notice is a mere technical
violation which constitutes harmless error.49 A mere technical violation
does not rise to the level of actionable error.
A criminal defendant declared to be an habitual violent felony offender
is subject to enhanced punishment pursuant to the habitual offender
statute.50 The statute defines an "habitual violent felony offender" as a
person who has "previously been convicted of a felony or an attempt or
conspiracy to commit a felony and one or more of such convictions was for"
one of the enumerated violent felonies listed in the statute.' In Tillman
v. State,52 and Reeves v. State," the supreme court upheld a defendant's
sentence as an habitual violent felony offender even though the offense of
conviction was a nonviolent felony. Since the defendant's prior conviction
of a violent felony indicated the "incorrigible and dangerous character of the
accused and establishe[s] the necessity for enhanced restraint,""' the
supreme court determined that the enhanced penalties met the statutory
objective of punishing recidivism.55 The supreme court also held that the
habitual violent felony offender provisions did not violate a defendant's
constitutional rights concerning due process, double jeopardy, or ex post
facto laws.56
In considering what sentence to give an habitual offender, the supreme
court resolved a conflict within the districts by declaring that a defendant
convicted of a life felony is not subject to enhanced punishment as an
habitual offender.57 Curiously, notwithstanding the legislative intent of
48. Massey v. State, 609 So. 2d 598, 600 (Fla. 1992).
49. Id.
50. FLA. STAT. § 775.084 (1991).
51. Id. § 775.084(l)(b).
52. 609 So. 2d 1295 (Fla. 1992).
53. 612 So. 2d 560 (Fla. 1992).
54. Tillman, 609 So. 2d at 1298.
55. This holding has been altered by Chapter 93-406 of the Laws of Florida, which
prohibits habitual offender sentencing if the current offense or one of the prior felonies is the
purchase or possession of drugs. Ch. 93-406, § 2, 1993 Fla. Laws 2911, 2913 (amending
FLA. STAT. § 775.084 (1991)).
56. Tillman, 609 So. 2d at 1297-98; Merriweather v. State, 609 So. 2d 1299 (Fla. 1992).
57. Lamont v. State, 610 So. 2d 435, 438 (Fla. 1992).
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severe punishment for habitual offenders, a trial judge has discretion to
place an habitual felony offender on probation. 8
D. Youthful Offenders
In State v. Arnette,59 the supreme court explained that a defendant
sentenced to prison and community control as a youthful offender maintains
that youthful offender status even upon a subsequent violation of community
control.6" Under the youthful offender statute, the maximum term of
imprisonment for a violation of community control is six years.6
E. Probation
A court is permitted to impose conditions of probation which are
reasonably related to the defendant's rehabilitation.62 When a defendant
challenges the relevance of a special condition of probation, the condition
is invalid if it "(1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender
was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3)
requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future
criminality. 63 Consequently, a condition of probation which prohibits the
use or possession of alcoholic beverages is improper where the offense was
not alcohol related and where the presentence investigation report contained
no suggestion that the defendant had a negative propensity toward alco-
hol.64
An uncounseled guilty plea to an offense will not support a revocation
of probation unless the defendant knowingly waived the right to counsel in
the earlier case.65 In order to shift the burden to the state to prove that the
convictions were counseled or that counsel was knowingly waived, a
defendant must do more than state under oath that no counsel was provided
in the prior proceedings.66 Utilizing the holding of State v. Beach,67 the
court held:
58. McKnight v. State, 616 So. 2d 31 (Fla. 1993).
59. 604 So. 2d 482 (Fla. 1992).
60. Id. at 484.
61. FLA. STAT. § 958.14 (1991).
62. Biller v. State, 618 So. 2d 734 (Fla. 1993).
63. Id. at 734-35.
64. Id. at 735.
65. State v. Rock, 605 So. 2d 456, 458 (Fla. 1992).
66. Id.
67. 592 So. 2d 237 (Fla. 1992).
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The defendant must assert four facts under oath in order to shift the
burden to the State: (1) that the offense involved was punishable by
more than six months of imprisonment or that the defendant was
actually subjected to a term of imprisonment; (2) that the defendant was
indigent, and thus, entitled to court-appointed counsel; (3) that counsel
was not appointed; and (4) that the right to counsel was not waived.68
An indigent defendant cannot be held to have violated probation due
to an inability to pay court-ordered restitution.69 If a probationer cannot
pay restitution or the costs of supervision, a court is required to consider
"alternative measures" of punishment other than imprisonment, such as
community service or similar measures which do not amount to community
control, probation, or imprisonment.7" A court has no ability to extend
probation upon a defendant's failure to pay, in the absence of finding that
the defendant willfully violated the terms of probation.71
F. Restitution
When restitution is made an original condition of probation, a court is
authorized to determine the amount of restitution at a later date, even
beyond sixty days after sentencing.7" Setting the amount of restitution
already authorized does not constitute the addition of a new condition of
probation."
Concern with the rights of crime victims continues to be an important
issue for the courts. In Hodge v. State,74 the court held that restitution
could be ordered for the reasonable value of the time necessarily spent and
the costs incurred by a theft victim in determining and documenting the
extent of loss as required by a fidelity bonding company.
68. Rock, 605 So. 2d at 458.
69. Hewett v. State, 613 So. 2d 1305, 1306-07 (Fla. 1993).
70. FLA. STAT. § 948.06(4) (1991).
71. Hewett, 613 So. 2d at 1307.
72. Gladfelter v. State, 618 So. 2d 1364, 1365 (Fla. 1993).
73. Id.
74. 603 So. 2d 1329 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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III. DISCOVERY
A. Access To Information
Defining the limits of reciprocal discovery has been a vexing problem
for prosecutors and defense lawyers alike. In Lanes v. State,75 the Third
District held that a defendant does not elect to participate in discovery in a
criminal case by engaging in discovery in a parallel administrative
proceeding. The court noted that while Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure
3.220(a)76 provides that "the defendant's taking of the deposition of any
person ... shall be an election to participate in discovery," the rule requires
"that the defendant must participate in the discovery process in the pending
criminal case in order to trigger the defendant's obligation to provide
reciprocal discovery to the state . . . ." The rule does not apply "to
discovery taken by the defendant in parallel administrative or civil proceed-
ings."5
78
A discovery deposition is not ordinarily admissible as substantive
evidence. However, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.1900) 71 governs
the taking of depositions intended to perpetuate testimony. In Rodriguez v.
State,8" the supreme court held that, unless a party complies with the
requirements of Rule 3.190(0), a traditional discovery deposition is not
admissible as substantive evidence, even though all parties participated in
the deposition and the witness is otherwise unavailable at the time of
trial.8  Without the safeguards found in Rule 3.1900),82 which are
designed to ensure that both parties have an opportunity and motive to fully
develop the deposition testimony, a discovery deposition does not qualify for
admission as evidence.
The Rodriguez decision may not end the "deposition as evidence"
discussion. The supreme court "requested that the Rules of Criminal
Procedure Committee consider and make recommendations as to whether the
Criminal Rules should be amended to provide for the use of discovery
depositions as substantive evidence subject to certain safeguards which
75. 603 So. 2d 1294 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
76. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.220(a).
77. Llanes, 603 So. 2d at 1297-98.
78. Id.
79. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.1900).
80. Rodriguez v. State, 609 So. 2d 493 (Fla. 1992), cert. denied, _ U.S. __ (1993).
81. Id. at 498-99.
82. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.1900).
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would be provided in the rules." 3 To date, the Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure Committee has not acted on the court's referral.
B. Privacy Interests
Another of the more celebrated cases to reach the Florida Supreme
Court this year was Post-Newsweek Stations v. Doe, 4 which involved the
Kathy Willets prostitution scandal. In July 1991, the Broward County
Sheriff's Office obtained a search warrant for the home of Kathy Willets
and her husband, Deputy Sheriff Jeffrey Willets, who were believed to be
involved in a criminal prostitution scheme. The police seized various pieces
of evidence, including a directory containing names and addresses, and other
lists stating the names, amounts paid, and sexual preferences of Kathy's
customers. When the state charged Kathy Willets with prostitution, and her
husband with living off the proceeds of prostitution, the defense requested
production of all materials seized during the search warrant, including
Kathy's list. Nervously, numerous John Does filed motions in the trial court
to deny public access to the pretrial discovery materials. Their concerns
were that release of the information would invade their privacy and damage
their personal and professional reputations. The trial court refused to
withhold release of the discovery, stating that people named on a prostitute's
client list have no reasonable expectation of privacy.85
The Florida Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that the John
Does possessed standing to challenge the release of the discovery materi-
als.86 Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(m) provides that "[u]pon
request of any person, the court may permit any showing of cause for denial
or regulation of disclosures, or any portion of such showing to be made in
camera."87  In addition, Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220(l)8
allows the court to restrict disclosure of discovery to protect a witness from
"harassment, unnecessary inconvenience or invasion of privacy."89
Having allowed the John Does to litigate the disclosure, the court began
an analysis of criminal procedure rules, the public records law, and the
constitutional right to privacy. The public does not have a universal right
to all discovery materials, and courts may act to protect the privacy interests
83. Rodriguez, 609 So. 2d at 499 n.2.
84. 612 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1992).
85. Id. at 550.
86. Id.
87. FLA. R. CRiM. P. 3.220(m).
88. FLA. R. CRiM. P. 3.220(l).
89. Post-Newsweek, 612 So. 2d at 550-51.
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of litigants and third parties.9" The party seeking to prevent disclosure
bears the burden of proving that restricting access is necessary to prevent an
imminent threat to privacy rights. 9' When balanced against the policy that
public records are to be open for public inspection and that access to pretrial
discovery information should be limited only when necessary to protect the
constitutional rights to a fair trial and due process, the supreme court
concluded that the John Does had no substantial privacy interest in their
names and addresses sufficient to negate production of the discovery. 92
With the right of access to discovery materials now firmly entrenched in
Florida jurisprudence, the moral of this case may well be that one must be
careful lest one's immorality becomes a public spectacle.
C. Discovery Violations
Discovery violations do not automatically mandate the imposition of
sanctions. In a criminal case, a trial court must consider all pertinent
circumstances before imposing sanctions for a discovery violation. When
sanctions are ordered, the court must impose the least severe sanction
necessary to address the violation.93 Excluding a witness as a sanction for
the state's failure to provide an address for the witness was found to be
erroneous because the trial court did not consider less severe sanctions, such
as ordering a continuance or directing the state to comply with the discovery
request.94
. A defendant offering an alibi witness is required to furnish the
prosecuting attorney with notice of an intent to call the witness, setting out
the name and address of the witness, at least ten days before trial.95 When
a defendant fails to provide advance notice, the trial court is required to
conduct a hearing to determine the circumstances of the defendant's failure
90. Id. at 553.
91. Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 So. 2d 113, 118 (Fla. 1988).
92. Post-Newsweek, 612 So. 2d at 553.
93. Austin v. State, 461 So. 2d 1380, 1381 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
94. State v. Schwartz, 605 So. 2d 1000, 1001 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992). The court
was mindful that the criminal process is intended to be a search for the truth:
In a system in which the search for truth is the principal goal, the severe
sanction of witness exclusion for failure to timely comply with the rules of
procedure should be a last resort and reserved for extreme or aggravated
circumstances, particularly when the excluded testimony relates to critical issues
or facts and the testimony is not cumulative.
Id. (quoting Austin, 461 So. 2d at 1381).
95. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.200.
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to provide notice before ordering sanctions.96 As often as the courts have
repeated this message, trial courts continue to impose sanctions without
holding the required hearing,97 even though the few minutes needed for a
hearing is so much more efficient than a subsequent retrial of the entire
case.
IV. JUVENILE PROCEDURE
The courts, perhaps like many parents, are experiencing problems
controlling unruly juveniles. Therefore, the authorized procedure for
punishing a juvenile for contempt of court was an important issue for the
court in A.A. v. Rolle,98 which involved a petition for writ of habeas corpus
challenging the incarceration of six children in secure detention facilities for
contempt of court. Chief Justice Barkett noted although juveniles can be
found in contempt of court, "juveniles may not be incarcerated for contempt
of court by being placed in secure detention facilities."99  The majority
opinion recognized that judges handling juvenile matters are often frustrated
by the deficiencies of Florida's juvenile justice system, and noted the
deficiencies were the result of a lack of adequate and meaningful fund-
ing.'0° The court noted the Legislature "has recognized the critical need
to provide appropriate placements or services for such children, but these
services have not been made available" to meet the needs of the chil-
dren. ' This is an area which is ripe for continued judicial attention, and
how involved the courts will become in overseeing the operation of
Florida's juvenile justice system is a serious question.
The Legislature also addressed some of the inadequacies of the juvenile
justice system,"' as it ordered the development of comprehensive, com-
munity-based juvenile programs and services. 13  The Legislature also
96. Small v. State, 608 So. 2d 829 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review granted, 621
So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1993).
97. See Richardson v. State, 246 So. 2d 771 (Fla. 1971).
98. 604 So. 2d 813 (Fla. 1992).
99. Id. at 818-19.
100. Id. at 819.
101. Id.
102. See Ch. 93-200, § 1, 1993 Fla. Laws 1799, 1800 (amending FLA. STAT. § 20.19
(Supp. 1992), to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 20.19(4)); Ch. 93-230, § 23, 1993 Fla. Laws
2359, 2373 (amending FLA. STAT. § 39.045(9) (1991)); Ch. 93-408, 1993 Fla. Laws 2975.
103. Ch. 93-200, § 1, 1993 Fla. Laws 1799, 1800 (amending FLA. STAT. § 20.19 (Supp.
1992), to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 20.19(4)).
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authorized the release of the names of juvenile offenders adjudicated guilty
of capital, life, first, or second degree felonies involving a victim."0 4
V. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
A. Right to Counsel
The right of the police to record or to intercept conversations between
a defendant and a co-defendant is severely restricted once the defendant has
been arrested and obtained counsel. In Peoples v. State,' °5 a defendant
obtained the services of defense counsel shortly after being arrested. After
the defendant was released on bail, the co-defendant, who had begun to
cooperate with the police, received permission from the police to record his
telephone conversations with the defendant. The recordings of these
conversations were admitted in evidence during the defendant's drug
trafficking trial. The supreme court found that the recordings were obtained
in violation of the defendant's right to counsel as guaranteed by the Florida
Constitution.0 6 That right to counsel attaches at the earliest of three
points, as indicated in Rule 3.111(a):' 0 7 "[w]hen [a defendant] is formally
charged with a crime via the filing of an indictment or information, or as
soon as feasible after custodial restraint, or at first appearance."'0 8 Plainly,
the defendant's constitutional right to counsel had attached and had been
invoked by the time the taped telephone conversations were made. In order
to avoid future confusion, the supreme court announced a bright line rule for
this situation: "[o]nce the section 16 right to trial counsel attaches and is
invoked, the State is barred from obtaining incriminating statements on a
charged offense by knowingly circumventing an accused's right to assistance
of counsel during a crucial encounter with the State."'0 9  In this case,
however, the introduction of the tape recordings at trial was deemed
harmless error.
104. Ch. 93-230, § 23, 1993 Fla. Laws 2359, 2373 (amending FLA. STAT. § 39.045(9)
(1991)).
105. 612 So. 2d 555 (Fla. 1992).
106. Id. at 556-67; see also FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
107. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.111(a).
108. Peoples, 612 So. 2d at 556 (quoting Traylor v. State, 596 So. 2d 957, 970 (Fla.
1992) (footnotes omitted)); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.111(a).
109. Peoples, 612 So. 2d at 557; see Phillips v. State, 612 So. 2d 557 (Fla. 1992) (right
to counsel under Florida and United States Constitutions attached upon appointment of
counsel at defendant's first appearance prior to initiation of adversarial proceeding).
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A trial court order prohibiting the defendant from speaking with
counsel during a recess immediately following direct examination of the
defendant, and prior to the defendant's cross-examination, implicates
constitutional protections and constitutes clear error which requires reversal,
unless there is no reasonable possibility the error affected the jury ver-
dict."O
B. Confessions and Admissions
The decision in State v. Guess.1. is convincing proof that Florida
courts are willing to utilize the Florida Constitution to guarantee rights
which are not protected by the United States Constitution. In Guess, the
supreme court held a trial court's refusal to receive the defendant's
testimony bn the voluntariness of a statement outside the presence of the
jury was error that is not subject to the harmless error analysis." 2 In so
holding, the Florida Supreme Court rejected the United States Supreme
Court holding in Arizona v. Fulminante,"3 which employed the harmless
error rule in situations involving the admission of an unconstitutionally
obtained confession. '14
The corpus delicti rule is a concept studied by every law student, but
promptly forgotten upon passing the Bar. Yet the rule is alive and well in
Florida, and is designed to limit the admission into evidence of a defen-
dant's confession in the absence of independent, substantial evidence which
proves the crime was committed." 5 The policy reason for the corpus delicti
rule is simple to understand: "[t]he judicial quest for truth requires that no
person be convicted out of derangement, mistake or official fabrication.""' 6
The rule is applicable to any statement by a defendant which tends to
establish or disprove a material fact in the case, including both confessions
and admissions against interest. ' 7  Circumstantial evidence remains
sufficient as a foundation for proving corpus delicti." 8
110. Amos v. State, 618 So. 2d 157, 161 (Fla. 1993).
Iii. 613 So. 2d 406 (Fla. 1992).
112. Id.
113. 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
114. Guess, 613 So. 2d at 407.
115. See Burks v. State, 613 So. 2d 441, 443 n.2 (Fla. 1993).
116. State v. Allen, 335 So. 2d 823, 825 (Fla. 1976).
117. See Burks, 613 So. 2d at 444.
118. Id. at 443.
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C. Double Jeopardy
Traditionally, under a federal constitutional analysis, a defendant cannot
be subjected to multiple punishments and successive prosecutions for two
or more offenses which contain the same elements.119 This traditional test
has been referred to as the "Blockburger test."'2° Recently, in Grady v.
Corbin,2' the Supreme Court added another element to the Blockburger
test, holding that a subsequent prosecution must satisfy the "same conduct"
test to avoid the double jeopardy bar.'22 The "same conduct" test provides
that "if, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that
prosecution, the government will prove conduct that constitutes an offense
for which the defendant has already been prosecuted," a second prosecution
may not be had.'23 Three years later, citing substantial dissatisfaction with
the Grady analysis, the Supreme Court overruled the "same conduct" test
and reestablished the preeminence of the Blockburger test.2"
Another doctrine involving double .jeopardy is that of "manifest
necessity." A mistrial occasioned by "manifest necessity" enables a
defendant to be retried without violating the prohibition against double
jeopardy.'25 However, if a jury is discharged, before reaching a verdict,
for legally insufficient reasons and without the defendant's consent, the
discharge precludes a subsequent trial for the same offense.2 6 In Perkins
v. Graziano,'27 one juror was erroneously dismissed after the jury had
been sworn, based on the juror's misunderstanding that the trial had been
canceled. The court thereafter declared a mistrial and discharged the jury
without exploring the alternatives of continuing the case while attempting
to locate the sixth juror or determining the availability of an alternate.
119. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 166 (1977).
120. Id.
121. 495 U.S. 508 (1990).
122. Id. at 510.
123. Id.
124. United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2864 (1993). The majority opinion,
written by Justice Scalia, is a fascinating exercise in distinguishing precedent and parsing
meaning from other authority. Additionally, Justice Scalia's pointed comments demonstrating
the errors of Justice Souter's analysis in Grady v. Corbin deserve close reading. Portions of
the discussion appear to suggest that Justice Souter actually miscited precedent. See id. at
2860-63.
125. United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. 579 (1824).
126. State ex rel. Williams v. Grayson, 90 So. 2d 710, 713 (Fla. 1956).
127. 608 So. 2d 532 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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Because this situation did not constitute a "manifest necessity" for a mistrial,
the subsequent trial was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause.12
Application of the "manifest necessity" standard for determining
whether a mistrial is appropriate requires a case-by-case analysis.'29
Courts have struggled with situations in which a trial participant or counsel
becomes ill or is viewed as unable to continue with the trial. 3° In
determining whether a particular trial event mandates the declaration of a
mistrial, the "Florida Constitution requires a trial judge to consider and
reject all possible alternatives before declaring a mistrial over the objection
of the defendant . . "'."' So, when a trial judge, sua sponte and without
considering and rejecting all possible alternatives, declared a mistrial based
on the subjective impression that defense counsel was not competent to
proceed with the trial because of illness, the defendant's double jeopardy
protection precluded a retrial. 32
D. Search and Seizure
In Minnesota v. Dickerson,133 a case certain to spawn extensive
litigation, the United States Supreme Court recognized the "plain feel"
doctrine, which authorizes the seizure of contraband detected through the
sense of touch during a patdown frisk. Using the analogy of the "plain
view" doctrine, the Court explained that a police officer lawfully engaged
in a patdown (where he or she can immediately identify an object as
contraband) is entitled to seize that property without a warrant. The
rationale is that there has been no invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond
that already authorized by the officer's search for weapons. 34  The
approval of this doctrine did not, however, salvage the seizure in Dickerson
because the police officer was unable to determine the incriminating
character of the object upon an initial feel. Instead, the officer conducted
a further exploratory search, which was not authorized by Terry v.
128. Id. at 533.
129. Thomason v. State, 620 So. 2d 1234, 1237 (Fla. 1993).
130. Perkins,608 So. 2d at 532; Cohens v. Elwell, 600 So. 2d 1224, 1225 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1992); Ostane v. Hickey, 385 So. 2d 110, 111 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1980).
131. Thomason, 620 So. 2d at 1239.
132. Id. at 1239-40. The defendant specifically advised the court he believed his counsel
could proceed and he wanted to proceed with the trial. Id. at 1236.
133. 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1993).
134. Id.
[Vol. 18
20
Nova Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1993], Art. 7
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol18/iss1/7
Kuehne
Ohio.1' Because the further search was constitutionally invalid, the
seizure of the cocaine was unconstitutional.
136
Identifying the circumstances which result in a voluntary abandonment
of property which is retrieved by the police was the subject of Hollinger v.
State. 37  Acknowledging the general rule that a seizure does not occur
until a person is actually physically subdued by an officer or submits to an
officer's show of authority,' the Florida Supreme Court held that where
a reasonable person, when approached by police officers clad in masks and
SWAT-team-type regalia, would not feel free to move, the subsequent
dropping of cocaine is the fruit of the officers' illegal seizure. Conse-
quently, contraband seized in such a case is properly suppressed.' 39
A similar situation resulted in a different conclusion in Perez v.
State,4 ° which involved a defendant who was chased by the police after
failing to heed a call to halt. The firearm which the defendant dropped
during the chase was declared by the court to have been abandoned, and the
recovery of the firearm was not an illegal seizure because the defendant vNas
not seized until he was actually caught by the police.' 4 ' The rationale for
the court's decision is simple: a defendant who flees from the police is not
subject to constitutional protections until apprehended, while a defendant
who remains pursuant to the police show of authority is entitled to the
protections of the Fourth Amendment.'
135. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishing a less intrusive "pat down" search as valid
on less than probable cause).
136. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. at 2138-39.
137. 620 So. 2d 1242 (Fla. 1993).
138. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
139. Hollinger, 620 So. 2d at 1243.
140. 620 So. 2d 1256, 1257 (Fla. 1993).
141. Id. at 1258.
142. See id. Perez contains an interesting philosophical discussion of precedent and the
nature of stare decisis. Perez held that the Florida Supreme Court "is bound to follow the
United States Supreme Court's interpretations of the Fourth Amendment and to provide no
greater protection than those interpretations." Id. Chief Justice Barkett and Justices Shaw
and Kogan dissented, concluding that the 1982 amendment to article I, section 12 of the
Florida Constitution incorporated only the existing opinions of the United States Supreme
Court and not future opinions. Id. at 1266, 1270. Justice Kogan declared that in view of the
"precipitous retreat from its own precedent that characterizes the... [Supreme] Court today,"
no one envisioned that the Supreme Court would take away those rights which were
recognized and approved by the precedent existing when the 1982 amendment was approved.
Perez, 620 So. 2d at 1270. Curiously, Justice Overton, who first stated the view that the
1982 amendment applied only to existing Supreme Court precedent and not to future
interpretations, Bernie v. State, 524 So. 2d 988, 994 (1988) (Overton, J., concurring in
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When a motor vehicle is lawfully stopped by a law enforcement officer
and the driver consents to a search of the vehicle, that consent extends to the
search of a closed paper bag found within the vehicle.'43 Further, the
United States Supreme Court held in United States v. Padilla'4 that the
rule regarding standing to challenge the constitutionality of a search or
seizure is not subject to a "co-conspirator exception." The Court rejected
this exception, that "a co-conspirator obtains a legitimate expectation of
privacy ...if he has either a supervisory role in the conspiracy or joint
control over the place or property involved in the search or seizure.""'
VI. TRIAL ISSUES
A. Evidence
The psychotherapist-patient privilege is not applicable to situations
involving child abuse or neglect, by action of the statutory requirement to
report child abuse. 146  The statute essentially waives the psychotherapist
privilege with regard to communications concerning child abuse. 47
Consequently, as part of the discovery process in a criminal case, a
defendant is entitled to examine a psychotherapist or psychologist concern-
ing communications he or she had with the victims of child abuse.148
The accident investigation privilege is designed to ensure that accident
information may be compelled from individuals involved in traffic accidents
without compromising constitutional protections.'49 But, the accident
investigation privilege cannot be used to bar the introduction of a driver's
statements regarding a traffic accident where the driver was never advised
he was obligated to answer questions, and where the driver was given his
judgment), nevertheless concluded that the doctrine of stare decisis mandated that the court
follow the existing precedent in Bernie, and incorporate all of Supreme Court Fourth
Amendment precedent. Perez, 620 So. 2d at 1259. Given the likelihood of future changes
in the membership of the Florida Supreme Court, this issue may be revisited.
143. State v. Hester, 618 So. 2d 1365, 1366 (Fla. 1993).
144. 113 S. Ct. 1936, 1937 (1993).
145. Id.
146. FLA. STAT. § 415.512 (1991).
147. Jett v. State, 605 So. 2d 926, 927 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992) (en banc), review
granted, 620 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1993).
148. Id. at 928.
149. See State v. Norstrom, 613 So. 2d 437, 440 (Fla. 1993); FLA. STAT. § 316.066(4)
(1991).
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Miranda rights. 5 ' The accident investigation privilege can be summarized
as follows: the accident investigation privilege is applicable if no Miranda
warnings are given; if a law enforcement officer gives any indication to a
defendant that the defendant must respond to questions concerning the
investigation, the officer must clearly state that "this is now a criminal
investigation," and follow immediately with Miranda warnings before any
statement by the defendant may be admitted against that defendant at
trial."'
In prosecuting drug offenses, prosecutors often attempt to utilize expert
testimony to explain the operation of drug organizations and the impact of
certain conduct taken by the defendants. Prosecutors often seek to introduce
this evidence in the form of expert opinion testimony. A limitation on the
ability of the prosecution to introduce expert opinion testimony is the result
of the decision in Ruth v. State.' In a prosecution for maintaining an
aircraft used for keeping or selling drugs, concealing aircraft registration
numbers, and aircraft registration fraud, the state introduced the expert
opinion of a customs agent that the aircraft was used to smuggle narcotics.
This opinion regarding the purported use of the aircraft addressed a
necessary element of the charged crime. The appellate court, recognizing
the considerable impact opinion testimony can have, held the evidence was
inadmissible because it constituted an opinion on the ultimate issue involved
in the trial."'
A defendant may not be convicted solely upon the basis of an expert
opinion as to the actual commission of the ultimate act which consti-
tutes the commission of the crime charged. Such a situation clearly
runs afoul of the ultimate issue rule. Without evidence of the actual
presence of drugs in connection with the use of the plane, it was error
to admit [the customs officer's] opinion testimony.'54
150. Id.; see also Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
151. Norstrom, 613 So. 2d at 440-41. In State v. Riley, 617 So. 2d 340 (Fla. Ist Dist.
Ct. App. 1993), the court certified the following question as one of great public importance:
WHETHER STATEMENTS MADE IN THE COURSE OF A POST-ACCI-
DENT INVESTIGATION BY AN INDIVIDUAL NOT IN POLICE CUSTODY
AND NOT GIVEN WARNINGS PURSUANT TO MIRANDA V. ARIZONA
ARE PRIVILEGED UNDER SECTION 316.066, FLORIDA STATUTES
(1991).
Id. at 341.
152. 610 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
153. Id. at 11.
154. Id.
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The court also held that the opinion was "purely speculation" and was not
based on facts or inferences supported by the evidence.'55 Without factual
support for the opinion, the erroneous opinion evidence invaded the
province of the jury. The defendant's conviction was, accordingly,
reversed. '56
Impeaching a witness through a prior felony conviction or a conviction
for an offense involving moral turpitude should be a rather simple process.
Yet, lawyers continue to attempt impeachment in a manner which informs
the jury of the underlying crime, which is almost always error. An
unsuccessful impeachment attempt occurred in Tampling v. State,157 where
the prosecutor cross-examined the defendant, asking whether the defendant
had been convicted of jury tampering. As surprising as it might seem for
a prosecutor to attempt that type of impeachment, it is inexplicable that the
trial judge overruled defense counsel's objection. 5 ' As a result, the
defendant's conviction was reversed, and the appellate court gave a lengthy
explanation instructing the parties on the only permissible method for
impeaching a witness by conviction of a prior crime:
[T]he prosecutor is permitted to attack the defendant's credibility by
asking whether the defendant has ever been convicted of a felony or a
crime involving dishonesty or false statement, and how many times. If
the defendant admits the number of prior convictions, the prosecutor is
not permitted to ask further questions regarding prior convictions, nor
question the defendant as to the nature of the crimes. If, however, the
defendant denies a conviction, the prosecutor can impeach him by
introducing a certified record of the conviction. The prosecutor is not
permitted to ask the defendant questions about prior convictions unless
the prosecutor has knowledge that the defendant has been convicted of
a crime and has evidence necessary for impeachment if the defendant
fails to admit the number of convictions for such crimes. The proper
method to impeach the witness who answers the question regarding his
prior convictions incorrectly, is to offer a certified record of the
witness's prior convictions, which will necessarily reveal the nature of
the crimes. It is improper for the prosecutor or questioning party to
name the specific crimes or to state the nature of the crimes.'59
155. Id. at 12.
156. Id.
157. 610 So. 2d 100, 101 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 101-02; (quoting Gavins v. State, 587 So. 2d 487, 489-90 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct.
App. 1990)).
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The supreme court had an opportunity to evaluate the admissibility of
DNA test results in Robinson v. State.60 While the court did not give a
green light to the admission of DNA evidence in every case, the court
nevertheless found the prosecution presented sufficient evidence demonstrat-
ing the reliability of the DNA testing method, while the defendant produced
neither evidence nor authority that questioned the general scientific
acceptance of the testing. 6' Consequently, the court held that the defen-
dant had not demonstrated abuse of the trial court's discretion regarding the
admissibility of DNA test results.1
62
Meanwhile, as the Florida Supreme Court was reiterating traditional
reliance on the "general acceptance" test for the admission of scientific
evidence, the United States Supreme Court held that the Federal Rules of
Evidence superseded the "general acceptance" test for admissibility of
scientific evidence first established in Frye v. United States.163 In Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,64 the Court noted that Rule 702 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence did not incorporate a "general acceptance"
standard as a prerequisite to admissibility.'65 In determining whether
scientific evidence is admissible, the Supreme Court set out the following
standard:
Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the trial
judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a), whether the
expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will
assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue. This
entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodolo-
gy underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that
reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue.
We are confident that federal judges possess the capacity to undertake
this review. Many factors will bear on the inquiry, and we do not
presume to set out a definitive checklist or test.' 66
160. 610 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992).
161. Id. at 1291.
162. Id. DNA profile evidence introduced by the prosecution in a burglary and sexual
battery offense obtained judicial approval in Toranzo v. State, 608 So. 2d 83 (Fla. Ist Dist.
Ct. App. 1992), review dismissed, 613 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1993).
163. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
164. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
165. Id. at 2794.
166. Id. at 2796 (footnotes omitted).
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Among the factors considered important by the Court were whether the
scientific methodology has been tested, whether the scientific theory has
been subjected to peer review, the known or potential rate of error, and the
level of support within the scientific community. The approach, the Court
emphasized, is "a flexible one."' 67
Given the similarity between Rule 702168 and the Florida analog,'69
the relevant question after Daubert was whether the Florida Supreme Court
would abandon the "general acceptance" test and move toward the more
flexible approach espoused by the Supreme Court. That did not happen
when the court was asked to approve "sexual offender profile evidence" in
Flanagan v. State.' 70 There, the Florida Supreme Court reaffirmed the
"general acceptance" test in concluding that "sexual offender profile
evidence" is not generally accepted in the scientific community and
therefore does not meet the test of admissibility for use in a sexual battery
prosecution. The court acknowledged the decision in Daubert,'7' but
stated firmly that "Florida continues to adhere to the Frye test for admissi-
bility of scientific opinions."'
172
The admissibility of similar fact evidence in a sexual battery case led
the supreme court to conduct a thorough analysis of the admissibility of
other crimes evidence in Williams v. State.173 There, the court acknowl-
edged that evidence of other criminal activity may be prejudicial, but is
subject to a "broad rule of admissibility based on relevancy ....
Especially in a sexual battery case, other nonconsensual sexual encounters
which are factually similar may well be probative of the defendant's
common plan or scheme to seek out particular victims and to rebut a
defense of consensual sex. When admitted, the court noted, the evidence
should not be "made the focal point of [the] trial" and "proper cautionary
instructions" should be given.' 75
167. Id. at 2797 (footnote omitted).
168. FED. R. EvID. 702.
169. FLA. STAT. § 90.702 (1991).
170. 18 Fla. L. Weekly S475 (Fla. Sept. 9, 1993).
171. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
172. Flanagan, 18 Fla. L. Weekly at S476 n.2.
173. 621 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1993).
174. Id. at 414.
175. Id. at 417.
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B. Jury Selection
In State v. Aldret, 76 the supreme court explained that "the state has
standing to object to a defendant's discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges under both the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and . . . the Florida Constitu-
tion."'77  In evaluating a claim of discriminatory peremptory challenges,
a trial court has abundant discretion in fashioning the appropriate remedy in
order to protect the constitutional rights of the parties.
178
It is now well settled that neither the state nor the defense is permitted
to exercise a peremptory challenge in a discriminatory or biased man-
ner. "'79 Appellate review of a trial court's ruling on peremptory challenges
utilizes the abuse of discretion standard, so long as the lower tribunal's
determination does not result from an incorrect application of the law. 80
Trial counsel must properly preserve the issue of alleged racial bias in
the exercise of peremptory challenges. In Joiner v. State,'8' the supreme
court instructed lawyers that moving to strike the jury panel is not the only
way to preserve a Neil 2 objection for review. A party sufficiently
preserves the issue by renewing the objection or by accepting a jury subject
to an earlier Neil objection.'83
When a party raises an objection that a peremptory challenge is being
utilized in a racially discriminatory manner, the trial court is required to
conduct an inquiry during which the offending party must provide a racially
neutral justification for exercising a peremptory strike.8 4  "[T]he proper
remedy in all cases where a trial court errs in failing to hold a Neil inquiry
is to reverse and remand for a new trial.' 85
176. 606 So. 2d 1156 (Fla. 1992).
177. Id. at 1458; see also FLA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
178. Id. at 1157; Jefferson v. State, 595 So. 2d 38, 41 (Fla. 1992).
179. State v. Slappy, 522 So. 2d 18, 22 (Fla.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1219 (1988).
Black Americans are not the only protected ethnic group. The protection against discrimina-
tory peremptory challenges was extended to hispanics as a cognizable ethnic group in State
v. Alen, 616 So. 2d 452, 455 (Fla. 1993).
180. Files v. State, 613 So. 2d 1301, 1304 (Fla. 1992).
181. 618 So. 2d 174 (Fla. 1993).
182. State v. Neil, 457 So. 2d 481 (Fla. 1984) (holding that presumption of constitution-
al use of peremptory challenges may be rebutted by a timely objection followed by a showing
that such challenge was based solely on race).
183. See Joiner, 618 So. 2d at 176.
184. State v. Johans, 613 So. 2d 1319, 1321-22 (Fla. 1993).
185. Id. at 1322; see also Valentine v. State, 616 So. 2d 971 (Fla. 1993). In Valentine,
the supreme court noted that "reversal would have been unnecessary if the trial court had
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C. Speedy Trial
The supreme court finally adopted a speedy trial rule for civil traffic
infractions in an attempt to remedy "the effect on an individual of outstand-
ing pending civil traffic infractions for an unreasonable time."' 86 Rule
6.325187 requires that "every defendant charged with a noncriminal traffic
infraction shall be brought to trial within 180 days of the date the alleged
infraction took place." If trial is not commenced within 180 days, the
defendant is entitled to dismissal of the infraction charged.' 88
When a trial date is set beyond the speedy trial time, and defense
counsel does not lodge an objection to the date, the defendant has not
waived the right to speedy trial. 89 The defendant or counsel must make
some affirmative statement in support of the trial date or request the
particular setting in order to waive speedy trial rights.
While defense counsel's devotion to a client is absolutely essential to
the proper operation of our criminal justice system, counsel must neverthe-
less play by the rules, even if fair play disadvantages the client. One such
example of defense counsel's failure to stay within the limits of appropriate
advocacy is found in State v. Reaves,'9" in which that court determined
that defense counsel played fast and loose in attempting to obtain a speedy
trial discharge. Counsel filed a demand for speedy trial in a pleading
entitled "Demand Pursuant To Rule 3.191(a)(2)" without including in the
caption the phrase "Demand for Speedy Trial." As anticipated by defense
counsel, the clerk of court, whose duty it is to notify the court of a speedy
trial demand and set a date for a calendar call, did not recognize the motion
as a speedy trial demand. The appellate court did not appreciate counsel's
calculating efforts. To prevent such miscarriages of justice in the future, the
court declared that Rule 3.191 "mandates the use of the phrase 'Demand for
Speedy Trial' in the captioning of that demand."' 9' In reversing the trial
simply followed Slappy's clear directive and resolved all doubt in favor of the objector. Our
holding in Johans will hopefully minimize such costly and frustrating errors-where a lengthy
and expensive trial is foredoomed at its very beginning for lack of a five-minute inquiry."
Id. at 975 (citations omitted).
186. In re Amendments to the Fla. Rules of Practice and Proc. for Traffic Courts, 608
So. 2d 451, 452 (Fla. 1992).
187. FLA. R. TRAFF. CT. 6.325.
188. Id.
189. Rivas v. Oppenbom, 605 So. 2d 516, 517 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
190. 609 So. 2d 701 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review denied, 623 So. 2d 494 (Fla.
1993).
191. Id. at 708.
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court's speedy trial discharge, the appellate court chastised defense counsel
for violating both the letter and the spirit of the oath of attorneys, finding
counsel had acted in a manner which subverted the cause of justice.'92
The court did not consider it significant that defense counsel's actions
initially led to the client's discharge.
D. Venue
Given the escalating number of high profile criminal cases in Florida,
determining where a fair trial can be held requires considerable effort.
Either the state or the defendant in a criminal case may move for a change
of venue "on the ground that a fair and impartial trial cannot be had in the
county where the case is pending for any reason other than the interest and
prejudice of the trial judge."'9 3 As a consequence of the notoriety associ-
ated with moving a criminal trial to another county, the Florida Legislature
recently amended the law relating to venue in criminal cases. The
amendment requires a court, after ordering a change of venue, to give
priority to any county which closely resembles the demographic composition
of the original venue.'94
The impetus for the change of venue legislation was the celebrated case
of Lozano v. State,'95 involving a Miami police officer who was tried for
and convicted of two counts of manslaughter in connection with a highly
publicized shooting. The third district reversed the convictions and ordered
a new trial, holding that the failure to grant Lozano's motion for a change
of venue denied him the right to a fair trial.'96 On remand, the trial court
granted a change of venue, ordering the case removed to Orlando. Then,
sua sponte, the court reconsidered the venue change "in light of the widely
publicized Los Angeles riots and the racial makeup of the Orlando
area," 97 and transferred the trial to Tallahassee.
This game of movable trials caused the chief judge of the Second
Judicial Circuit to issue a sua sponte order removing and remanding the case
back to Orlando. The Florida Supreme Court, concerned with the public's
perception of the court system as a "ping-pong game" which undermined
192. Id. at 709.
193. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.240(a).
194. Ch. 93-225, § 1, 1993 Fla. Laws. 2336, 2337 (amending FLA. STAT. § 910.03
(1991), to be codified at FLA. STAT. 910.03(2)).
195. 584 So. 2d 19 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1991), review denied, 595 So. 2d 558 (Fla.
1992).
196. Id. at 23.
197. State v. Gary, 609 So. 2d 1291, 1292 (Fla. 1992).
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confidence in the judicial function, declared that "absent extraordinary
circumstances, a trial judge's order granting a change of venue may not be
reviewed by a successor trial judge in the new venue. Once such an order
has been issued, it must be honored in the new venue unless and until a
proper appellate court rules otherwise."' 98
E. Jury Instructions
Under Florida law, a party is entitled to an instruction on a permissive
lesser included offense when both the accusatory pleading and the evidence
support the commission of that offense.' 99 In State v. Von Deck,00 the
court answered the question of whether aggravated assault on a police
officer is a lesser included offense of the attempted murder of a police
officer. In that case, the defendant objected to the state's requested
instruction on the permissive lesser included offense of aggravated assault,
arguing that all the elements of this offense were not contained in the
information. The defendant was found guilty of aggravated assault and
appealed. The supreme court held that the prosecution is obligated to allege
a "putting in fear" element whenever it seeks an instruction on the
permissive lesser included offense of aggravated assault. 20 ' Because the
attempted murder information did not allege that necessary element, the trial
court should not have instructed the jury on aggravated assault as a lesser
included offense.20 2
In Taylor v. State, °3 the supreme court explained the distinction
between category-one "necessarily lesser included offenses" and category-
two "permissive lesser included offenses. 20 4 When "the commission of
one offense always results in the commission of another, the latter offense
is a category-one necessarily lesser included offense., 2 1 If the lesser
offense has at least one statutory element not contained in the greater, it
cannot be a category-one necessarily lesser included offense, but may be a
category-two permissive lesser included offense if all the required elements
198. Id. at 1294. The Lozano trial ultimately took place in Orlando, and resulted in an
acquittal on all counts. The result caused no riots in any community.
199. Brown v. State, 206 So. 2d 377, 383 (Fla. 1968).
200. 607 So. 2d 1388 (Fla. 1992).
201. Id. at 1389.
202. Id.
203. 608 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 1992).
204. Id. at 805.
205. Id. (citing State v. Weller, 590 So. 2d 923 (Fla. 1991)).
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are alleged in the accusatory pleadings and proven at trial.2" 6 In determin-
ing whether a defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction,
the trial court must analyze the charging document to see if the necessary
elements of the lesser offense are included.
When a jury asks a question during deliberations, the trial judge must
give counsel an opportunity to be heard before answering the jury's
question."' The failure to observe this rule constitutes per se reversible
error without regard to the harmless error rule.2" 8 Similarly, it is per se
reversible error when a trial court, in responding to a jury's request for
additional instructions, forwards the entire set of written instructions to the
jury without providing prior notice to the parties.20 9
F. Entrapment
In State v. Hunter,1 ° the supreme court held as violative of due
process the practice in cases where the informant's contingent fee was
conditioned on the giving of testimony. In those instances, the defense of
objective entrapment was permitted.21" ' The use of a paid confidential
informant to solicit the defendant's participation in criminal activity does not
violate due process, however, where payments to the informant were not
conditioned on the giving of trial testimony or on the obtaining of an
arrest.21 2
In Munoz v. State,1 3 the supreme court ruled that the objective
entrapment test has been abolished by the Legislature. The court analyzed
the subjective entrapment test still in use, and validated the two part test: (1)
whether the government agent induced the charged offense, and (2) whether
the accused was predisposed to commit the offense. The court acknowl-
edged that while entrapment is ordinarily a jury question, a trial judge has
the authority to rule on entrapment as a matter of law where the facts are
206. Id.
207. Mills v. State, 620 So. 2d 1006 (Fla. 1993).
208. Id. at 1007 n.l (citing Cherry v. State 572 So. 2d 521, 522 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1990)).
209. State v. Franklin, 618 So. 2d 171 (Fla. 1993).
210. 586 So. 2d 319 (Fla. 1991).
211. Id. at 321.
212. State v. Sargent, 617 So. 2d 1115 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Taylor v. State,
612 So. 2d 626, 629 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.), review granted, _ So. 2d _ (Fla. 1993); State
v. Ramos, 608 So. 2d 830 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review granted, 617 So. 2d 321
(Fla. 1993).
213. 18 Fla. L. Weekly S537 (Fla. Oct. 14, 1993).
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not in dispute and the state fails to muster sufficient evidence of predisposi-
tion.
In Fruetel v. State,2"4 the appellate court held that the state's actions
constituted entrapment as a matter of law when a defendant, with no prior
criminal history, who was not the subject of an ongoing criminal investiga-
tion, was contacted by an informer whose sentence was subject to reduction
if he provided evidence which would lead to a drug arrest.215 The
informant in that case furnished the defendant with the money needed to
purchase drugs and even advised the defendant on how to proceed with the
drug transaction. The record revealed that the informant "acted in the drug
transaction without supervision and the record does not contain any evidence
that would show the police 'utilized means reasonably tailored to apprehend
only those already involved in ongoing criminal activity.""'2 6 Under those
circumstances, the Fourth District did not hesitate to reverse the defendant's
drug convictions and order the defendant's discharge.2"7 In light of the
judicial concern with the possibility that informants might fabricate evidence
in order to obtain a substantial personal benefit, law enforcement would be
wise to develop criteria for strict control and supervision of a cooperating
individual.
The illegal manufacture of crack cocaine by law enforcement officials
for use in reverse-sting operations constitutes governmental misconduct
which violates the due process clause of the Florida Constitution.2"8
Therefore, a conviction for purchasing drugs manufactured by law
enforcement officers is improper. In such a case, the supreme court has
expressed its concern with law enforcement officers who choose to use
methods which "cannot be countenanced with a sense of justice and
fairness." '219
VII. SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL OFFENSES
A. Driving Offenses
While driving a motor vehicle is generally regarded as a privilege and
214. 609 So. 2d 697 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
215. Id at 699.
216. Id. at 700.
217. Id.
218. State v. Williams, 623 So. 2d 462 (Fla. 1993).
219. Id. at 467.
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not a right, most drivers consider driving to be a necessity. A suspension
or revocation of driving privileges may have enormous practical conse-
quences to a driver. The Department of Motor Vehicles has authority to
seek review of an order reinstating the privilege to drive by petitioning for
certiorari review from the order of the lower tribunal.22 ° The standard of
review remains a determination of whether the court departed from the
essential requirements of the law.
Defendants routinely challenge the admissibility of blood alcohol test
results based on the failure of the Department of Health and Rehabilitative
Services ("HRS") to promulgate rules establishing standards for the use,
maintenance, testing, and upkeep of testing equipment. In Mehl v.
State,22' the court found that HRS met the statutory requirement of
providing an approved method of administration of the blood test.
Nevertheless, in order to promote public knowledge of testing requirements,
the supreme court declared that:
beginning at 12:01 a.m. on January 1, 1994, the State shall not be
allowed the benefit of the presumptions established in § 316.1934,
Florida Statutes (1989), unless (a) the [S]tate has established reasonable
definite rules specifying the precise methods of blood alcohol testing
that are approved for use in this State, and (b) the State and its agencies
substantially comply with these rules. Of course, even when the
presumption is not available, the State should still have the benefit of
the Robertson analysis, upon a proper request.
Continued problems with blood alcohol testing may have led to the
Mehl decision. For example, in Robertson v. State,223 the question before
the court was whether the prosecution should be permitted to introduce into
evidence test results of blood samples taken at the request of a law
enforcement officer if the statutory requirements were not satisfied.224
The court held that even if the person conducting the blood test was not
220. State Dept. of Highway Safety v. DeShong, 603 So. 2d 1349, 1351 (Fla. 2d Dist.
Ct. App. 1992).
221. 18 Fla. L. Weekly S487 (Fla. Sept. 16, 1993).
222. Id. at S488.
223. 604 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1992).
224. Id. at 787. The blood sample in Robertson was taken by a nurse at the direction
of an investigating police officer, who was attempting to gather evidence for a drunk driving
investigation. Id. at 786. The blood was analyzed by a licensed physician, who did not have
a valid HRS permit for the purpose of performing a blood-alcohol test pursuant to section
316.1933(2), Florida Statutes (1987).
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licensed by HRS, the test results are nevertheless admissible, provided that
the blood was drawn by a person authorized to do so by the implied consent
statute, 225 and the prosecution can establish that the test was reliable, was
performed by a qualified operator with proper equipment, and an expert
provides competent testimony concerning the meaning of the test.226
Drunk driving continues to have extraordinary consequences, beyond
what many casual drinkers may believe. A trial court has the power to
impose any valid condition of probation that serves a rehabilitative purpose.
For example, a condition of probation requiring the defendant to place and
pay for a newspaper ad consisting of the defendant's mug shot, name, and
the caption "DUI-convicted" was an allowable sanction.227
Yet another example of the dangers of drugs and the serious conse-
quences for those caught in possession of drugs is found in Lite v. State.228
There, the supreme court upheld the constitutionality of section 322.055(1)
of the Florida Statutes,229 which requires the revocation of the driving
license of those persons convicted of possession, sale, or trafficking of
controlled substances. The law was declared to be constitutional against a
claim that it violated substantive due process.
2 31
B. Burglary
What constitutes possession of "burglary tools" was discussed by the
court in Green v. State.23 ' There, the court considered the following
question: "[a]re items of personal apparel, such as common gloves, included
under the terms 'tool, machine, or implement' as used in section 810.06, [of
the] Florida Statutes?" 23 2 The court held that while "[c]ommon household
objects, which . . . might have a useful and lawful purpose, may be
classified as burglary tools if they are used with the intent to commit a
burglary," gloves and other items of personal apparel "are not objects which
225. FLA. STAT. § 316.1933(2)(a) (1987), includes a list of qualified health care
professionals. The Legislature amended the statute in 1991 to include other categories of
healthcare professionals. Ch. 91-255, §§ 2-3, 1991 Fla. Laws 2442, 2448 (amending FLA.
STAT. §§ 316.1932, 316.1933 (1989)).
226. Robertson, 604 So. 2d at 791.
227. Lindsay v. State, 606 So. 2d 652 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review denied, 618
So. 2d 209 (Fla. 1993).
228. 617 So. 2d 1058 (Fla. 1993).
229. FLA. STAT. § 322.055(1) (Supp. 1990).
230. Lite, 617 So. 2d at 1059.
231. 604 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1992).
232. Id. at 472.
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actually facilitate the breaking and entering of a dwelling." '233 Conse-
quently, the court gave a plain and ordinary meaning to the statute and
declined to extend the definition of "tool, machine, or implement" to articles
of clothing. 34
C. Kidnapping
A kidnapping conviction requires proof of the forced movement or
confinement of the victim during the commission of another felony.235 In
Walker v. State,236 the supreme court revisited the question of what
constitutes movement in a kidnapping context. The court reiterated the
existing rule that
for a kidnapping conviction to stand, the resulting movement or
confinement (a) must not be slight, inconsequential, and merely
incidental to the other offense; (b) must not be of the kind inherent in
the nature of the other offense; and (c) must have some significance
independent of the other offense in that it makes the other offense
substantially easier to commit or substantially lessens the risk of
detection.237
The particular circumstances in Walker did not meet that test, because the
limited movement of the robbery victims was slight and inconsequential, and
was merely incidental to the robbery.23
D. Hate Crimes
The continuing escalation of hate crimes throughout Florida and the
country has led to the enactment of "hate crimes" statutes. The statutes are
233. Id. at 473.
234. Id.
235. Faison v. State, 426 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1983).
236. 604 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1992).
237. Id. at 477.
238. Id. In Walker, the defendant entered a convenience store, took money from the
cash register, and then ordered all occupants of the store to go to the back room and lie on
the floor. Three victims moved a short distance away but did not lie down. The fourth
victim moved a shorter distance after the defendant threatened to shoot. The defendant
immediately left the store. The court noted that the victims were not bound, blindfolded,
barricaded inside a room, or dragged from room to room. Id. at 476. But see Faison, 426
So. 2d at 965-66; Marsh v. State, 546 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1989); Johnson v.
State, 509 So. 2d 1237 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
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designed to outlaw discrimination in the selection of a crime victim." 9
The Florida "hate crimes" law enhances the penalties for the commission of
any felony or misdemeanor which is motivated by bigotry and preju-
dice.24° In this term, the United States Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of a Wisconsin statute. 24' The statute provided for enhancement
of a criminal sentence whenever the defendant intentionally selects the
victim based on the victim's race. The Court found that the statute did not
violate free speech rights.242
Although the Florida Supreme Court has yet to rule on the constitution-
ality of the similarly drafted Florida hate crimes law,243 the statute was
ruled constitutional in Dobbins v. State.244 "[I]t is the act of discrimina-
tion against people because of their race, color or religion by making them
victims of crime that is prohibited and punished, not the specific opinion
that leads to that discrimination. 245
E. Fraud
The Florida statewide prosecutor is authorized by statute to prosecute
certain crimes that occur within two or more judicial circuits. 246 The prior
version of the statewide prosecutor statute provided jurisdiction for offenses
which included "criminal fraud" as an actionable crime. 247  The court in
State v. Nuckolls 2 48 gave an expansive definition of criminal fraud for
purposes of statewide prosecutor jurisdiction. The court held that the
239. E.g., Federal Religion Vandalism Act, 18 U.S.C. § 247 (1989); Federal Hate
Crimes Statistics Act, Pub. L. No. 101-275 (1990); FLA. STAT. § 775.085 (1991).
240. FLA. STAT. § 775.085 (1991).
241. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993). The Supreme Court distinguished
the Wisconsin statute from the hate crimes ordinance found unconstitutional in R.A.V. v. City
of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538 (1992), because the ordinance in R.A. V punished protected
public expression. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2196.
242. Mitchell, 113 S. Ct. at 2196.
243. The Florida Supreme Court is considering the constitutionality of the Florida hate
crimes law in State v. Stalder, 599 So. 2d 1280 (Fla. 1992). The parties presented oral
argument on September 1, 1992.
244. 605 So. 2d 922 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App.), reviewgranted, 613 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1992).
245. Id. at 925-26.
246. FLA. STAT. § 16.56(1)(a) (Supp. 1992).
247. Id. Effective April 8, 1992, section 16.56 (1)(a) of the Florida Statutes, was
amended to delete the reference to "criminal fraud" and substitute "any crime involving, or
resulting in, fraud or deceit upon any person." FLA. STAT. § 16.56(1)(a) (Supp. 1992); Ch.
92-108, § 2, 1992 Fla. Laws 906, 907 (amending FLA. STAT. § 16.56 (1991)).
248. 606 So. 2d 1205 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
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Legislature intended to incorporate a variety of violations which fell within
the generic heading of criminal fraud, rather than limit the reach of the
statute to a particular fraud crime.
249
F. Lewd and Lascivious Conduct
Florida law authorizes the prosecution of any person who "[k]nowingly
commits any lewd or lascivious act in the presence of any child under the
age of 16 years without committing the crime of sexual battery ....
The defendant in State v. Werner25 was charged with a violation of the
lewd and lascivious conduct statute as a result of his act of masturbating in
the presence of his 13-month-old daughter. At trial, the defense moved for
a judgment of acquittal based on the state's failure to prove that the child
victim was actually aware of the lewd and lascivious act, as opposed to
merely being present when the act occurred. 5
The supreme court, in an exercise of statutory interpretation, deter-
mined that the meaning of "presence" as used in section 800.04(4),
"encompasses sensory awareness as well as physical proximity." '253 The
court was of the view that incorporating an awareness element was legally
correct and made practical sense. The court held that
[a]pplying the legal as well as the common-sense meaning of the word
'presence' to section 800.04(4), leads us to the conclusion that, while
the child need not be able to articulate or even comprehend what the
offender is doing, the child must see or sense that a lewd or lascivious
act is taking place for a violation to occur.254
The child victim in this case was too young to be aware of the father's
masturbation.
G. Public Corruption
In a potential benefit to prosecutors pursuing public corruption cases,
the Fourth District Court of Appeal construed the "official misconduct"
249. Id. at 1207.
250. FLA. STAT. § 800.04(4) (1992) (emphasis added).
251. 609 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1992).
252. Id. at 586.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 587.
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statute in Bauer v. State.255 The statute defining "official misconduct" '56
contains a general intent element of knowing that the act was unlawful, and
requires a specific intent only insofar as proving that the defendant intended
to cause a benefit to himself or harm to another.257 In this type of public
corruption case, a prosecutor need only prove that the defendant acted with
knowledge that the actions taken were wrongful and unlawful, and that the
defendant intended to reap a benefit or harm another. This statutory
analysis is likely to expand the possible uses of the statute to prosecute
public corruption cases.
H. Contempt
A direct criminal contempt results when offending conduct is commit-
ted in the actual presence of a judge.258 It may be punished summarily by
the judge who saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt. In
contrast, indirect criminal contempt, defined by Rule 3.840,259 concerns
conduct that has occurred outside the presence of the judge.26 ° The
indirect criminal contempt procedure requires that all procedural aspects of
the criminal justice process be accorded a defendant, including a charging
document, an answer, the right to bail, an arraignment, and a hearing. A
defendant is entitled to representation by counsel, may compel the
attendance of witnesses, and may testify.26" ' In Gidden v. State, the court
255. 609 So. 2d 608 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992), review denied, 613 So. 2d I (Fla.
1993).
256. Section 839.25 of the Florida Statutes provides:
(1) "Official misconduct" means the commission of the following act by
a public servant, with corrupt intent to obtain a benefit for himself or another
or to cause unlawful harm to another:
(a) Knowingly refraining, or causing another to refrain, from performing
a duty imposed upon him by law; or
(b) Knowingly falsifying, or causing another to falsify, any official record
or official document.
(2) "Corrupt" means done with knowledge that the act is wrongful and
with improper motives.
(3) Official misconduct under this section is a felony of the third degree
FLA. STAT. § 839.25 (1991). This statute was amended in 1991 by eliminating subsection
(I)(a) as a form of official misconduct.
257. Bauer, 609 So. 2d at 610.
258. Gidden v. State, 613 So. 2d 457, 460 (Fla. 1993).
259. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.840.
260. Gidden, 613 So. 2d at 460.
261. Id.
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held that the defendant may be charged with indirect criminal contempt for
failing to appear as required by his conditions of bond.262
In finding the defendant guilty of indirect criminal contempt, a court
is required to, at a minimum, announce oral findings on the record.263
"[W]ritten findings are discretionary, not mandatory. 264  This is in
contrast to the exacting requirements of direct criminal contempt, which
mandate that the "judgment of guilt of contempt shall include a recital of
those facts upon which the adjudication of guilt is based. 265
I. Concealed Weapons
Whether a firearm is "readily accessible for immediate use" within the
meaning of the concealed weapon statute266 continues to be an elusive
concept. In Ridley v. State,267 the police located a gun under the driver's
seat of a car, and found ammunition for the gun and a fully loaded clip
under the passenger's seat. This location and accessibility of the firearm
and ammunition made the firearm readily accessible for immediate use for
purposes of' securing a concealed weapon conviction. 26' This conclusion
prompted a dissent from Justice Kogan, who analogized an empty gun to
one which is carried in the vehicle while "securely encased. 269  The
carrying of a "securely encased" weapon in a vehicle is not a crime.27°
Justice Kogan found the court's contrary conclusion to be inconsistent with
the statutory rationale which favors the "lawful use, ownership, and
possession of firearms and other weapons. 27'
J. Loitering
Although municipalities typically utilize loitering statutes for the
purpose of policing areas of the community, such ordinances are of
questionable constitutionality. Three such ordinances, which prohibited
262. Id.
263. Id at 459.
264. Id. (citing Gidden v. State, 593 So. 2d 294, 294-95 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
265. FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.830 (emphasis added).
266. FLA. STAT. § 790.01(2) (1992).
267. 621 So. 2d 409 (Fla. 1993).
268. Id. See Ashley v. State, 619 So. 2d 294 (Fla. 1993) (an unloaded gun in a car with
no ammunition anywhere in the car is not readily accessible for immediate use, but an
unloaded gun underneath the seat with bullets lying in open view is readily accessible).
269. Ridley, 621 So. 2d at 410 (Kogan, J., dissenting).
270. Id.; see also FLA. STAT. § 790.25(5) (1991).
271. Ridley, 621 So. 2d at 410 (Kogan, J., dissenting).
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loitering for the purposes of engaging in drug-related activity,2"2 soliciting
for prostitution,273 and illegally using a controlled substance,274 were
declared unconstitutional on the basis of vagueness, overbreadth, and a
violation of substantive due process. In light of the court's clear distaste for
loitering ordinances, municipalities would do well to develop other methods
of protecting the citizenry.
VIII. FORFEITURE
In a case having substantial consequences for the government in
forfeiture cases, the supreme court precluded the RICO forfeiture of
homestead property, finding that the constitutional provision exempting
homesteads from forced sale was intended to guarantee that homestead
property be preserved against any involuntary divestiture by the courts.27
This decision may make forfeiture much more difficult in Florida, especially
in view of the generous definition given to homestead property in the
Florida Constitution.276
Because forfeiture of property is a harsh sanction, the Florida Supreme
277Court has strictly construed the forfeiture statute. A person challenging
a forfeiture must be in a position to demonstrate a recorded title or
compliance with the requirements for receiving title.278 For example, in
Byrom v. Gallagher, there was an attempted forfeiture of an airplane.
Byrom asserted an interest in the airplane based on his prior purchase of the
plane. Unfortunately for the claimant, the registration of Byrom's owner-
ship by the Federal Aviation Administration had not taken place as of the
time the airplane was seized. Consequently, the circuit court found that
Byrom lacked standing to contest the forfeiture. The district court affirmed,
finding that because Byrom did not have title to the airplane, he did not
have standing to contest the forfeiture.279
The supreme court reversed, concluding that where seized property is
subject to title laws, the claimant must hold title or show compliance with
272. E.L. v. State, 619 So. 2d 252 (Fla. 1993).
273. Wyche v. State, 619 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 1993).
274. Holliday v. City of Tampa, 619 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1993).
275. Butterworth v. Caggiano, 605 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1992).
276. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4.
277. Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property, 588 So. 2d 957, 961 (Fla.
1991).
278. Byrom v. Gallagher, 609 So. 2d 24, 26 (Fla. 1992).
279. Id. at 26.
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title requirements in order to show ownership."' A court should not
defeat an owner's claim for technical reasons. Instead, the supreme court
cautioned judges to conduct a searching inquiry in identifying individuals
who have standing to contest a forfeiture:
Consequently, in determining whether a person has standing the trial
judge should consider: (1) whether that person holds legal title at the
time of the forfeiture hearing or has complied with the requirements for
receiving title; and (2) whether that person is in fact a bona fide
purchaser. The trial judge should consider the facts surrounding the sale
to determine whether the transfer is in fact a bona fide purchase. The
relationship of the parties, the date the instruments were executed, the
value of the property, the sale price, and canceled checks or bank
deposits to show actual payment and receipt of money are all factors
which the trial court should consider in determining whether the transfer
is a bona fide purchase.2"'
In an effort to promote uniformity in the case style of forfeiture
actions, the Fourth District ruled in Fink v. Holt,2 2 that the case caption
in a forfeiture case must
identify the party seeking the forfeiture and the parties claiming an
interest in [the seized property], if known. A description of the
property to be forfeited should be used in the caption only where the
owner or some lienor is unknown. Similarly, when there is an appeal
from the forfeiture proceeding, the applicable rule of appellate proce-
dure requires that the caption contain the name and designation of at
least one party on each side.283
Thus, forfeiture proceedings should be brought in the name of the seizing
person or authority, and against the person claiming the property.
An owner or bona fide lienholder having an interest in property subject
to forfeiture may defeat a forfeiture action by establishing, by a preponder-
ance of the evidence, a lack of knowledge the property was being used in
criminal activity.28 4  A certificate of title to a motor vehicle establishes
280. Id.
281. Id. (enphasis added).
282. 609 So. 2d 1333 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
283. Id. at 1335.
284. In re Forfeiture of 1989 Isuzu Pickup Truck, 612 So. 2d 695 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1993). The Supreme Court recently came to the same conclusion in a federal forfeiture
case. United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 113 S. Ct. 1126 (1993).
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presumptive ownership of the vehicle. The presumption can be overcome
only by clear and convincing evidence.285
IX. POST CONVICTION AND APPEAL
For those lawyers handling criminal appeals, knowing when a brief is
due is a critical component of the practice of law, especially to keep
malpractice rates low. In Kuznik v. State,2 86 the circuit court, acting in its
appellate capacity, dismissed an appeal due to the untimely filing of the
record and initial brief, notwithstanding that a motion for extension of time
was pending before the court. On certiorari review of the dismissal order,
the Second District reinstated the appeal, holding that the "motion for
extension tolled the time to file his brief.'2 87  The court previously
cautioned, however, that a frivolous motion for extension will not toll the
filing time.288
Post-conviction proceedings and collateral attacks on criminal
convictions continue to demand the attention of Florida courts, particularly
the Florida Supreme Court in death penalty matters. What qualifies for
post-conviction relief remains a source of uncertainty. Claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel, both at the trial and appellate stages, are by far the
most frequently litigated issue in post-conviction and habeas corpus
proceedings, but meeting the standard is difficult.
In order to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel, the petitioner must show that counsel's
performance fell below an objective standard of reasonable-
ness and, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, there is a
reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would
have been different.289
Ordinarily, a claim that defense counsel was ineffective is tested in a
post-conviction proceeding in state or federal court. An unusual twist led
the Florida Supreme Court to impose discipline in the form of a sixty day
suspension for an attorney who failed to properly prepare a first degree
285. In re Forfeiture of 1989 Isuzu Pickup Truck, 612 So. 2d at 697.
286. 604 So. 2d 37 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
287. Id. at 37.
288. E.g., Blanton v. State, 561 So. 2d 587 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
289. Scott v. Dugger, 604 So. 2d 465, 469 (Fla. 1992) (citing Strickland v. Washington
466 U.S. 688 (1984); Johnson v. Dugger, 523 So. 2d 161 (Fla. 1988)).
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murder case. In The Florida Bar v. Sandstrom,29 a defendant convicted of
the first degree murder of his wife succeeded in obtaining a vacation of the
conviction based upon allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel
because defense counsel failed to properly investigate and present evidence
that would have established the wife's death was attributable to medical
malpractice. The Florida Bar charged the attorney with inadequate
preparation and neglecting a legal matter, and sought disciplinary sanc-
tions.29'
The referee agreed the defense counsel provided deficient representa-
tion, and that those deficiencies rose to the level of an unethical violation
for inadequate preparation and neglect of a legal matter.292 The referee
recommended a one year suspension. The supreme court concluded the
defense counsel was guilty of violating the disciplinary rules, but found only
a sixty day suspension was warranted. The court recognized that disciplin-
ary action for ineffective representation is unusual, but that it was justified
in this case:
We note that most cases of ineffective assistance of counsel do not
rise to the level of a disciplinary violation. However, the circumstances
of this case involved such a flagrant lack of preparation and such
deficient performance by counsel as to warrant the finding that
Sandstrom violated the disciplinary rules.293
Counsel would be well advised to heed this warning when preparing cases.
Additionally, a conviction or a sentence may be set aside or vacated as
a result of "newly discovered evidence." In an effort to define the circum-
stances in which a claim may be made, the Florida Supreme Court recently
reiterated the basic standard of proof.294 To prevail on a claim of newly
discovered evidence, a defendant must satisfy two requirements. First, the
asserted facts "must have been unknown by the trial court, by the party, or
by counsel at the time of trial, and it must appear that defendant or his
counsel could not have known them by the use of diligence.""29 Second,
290. 609 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 1992).
291. Id.
292. Id. at 584.
293. Id. at 584 n.I.
294. See Scott, 604 So. 2d at 465; Jones v. State, 591 So. 2d 911 (Fla. 1991).
295. Scott, 604 So. 2d at 468 (quoting Hallman v. State, 371 So. 2d 482, 485 (Fla.
1979). The Scott case involved a newly discovered evidence claim in a death penalty case.
Id. at 468. A co-defendant's life sentence, imposed after appellate affirmance of the
defendant's death sentence, constitutes newly discovered evidence for which post-conviction
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"the newly discovered evidence must be of such nature that it would
probably produce an acquittal on retrial. 296
Post-conviction relief may also be granted when a defendant pleads
guilty or no contest to criminal charges, relying on the incorrect advice and
counsel of a defense lawyer. Defense counsel's inaccurate non-record
assurances to the defendant regarding sentencing consequences may
undermine the voluntariness of the defendant's plea, provided defense
counsel "knew or should have known" the representations were inaccu-
rate.2 97 It is for this reason trial courts should conduct a thorough and
exacting inquiry when accepting a plea to ensure the defendant has no other
understanding regarding the consequences of a plea.
The defense counsel must make every effort to correctly communicate
the facts and merits of a plea bargain offered by the state to the client. The
failure to do so may result in the granting of post-conviction relief, provided
the defendant is in a position to prove (1) that the defense counsel failed to
communicate a plea offer or misinformed the defendant concerning the
penalty, (2) that had the defendant been correctly advised, the defendant
would have accepted the plea offer, and (3) that the defendant's acceptance
of the plea offer would have resulted in a lesser sentence.298
Uniformity of judicial decisions extends to treating co-defendants
similarly for appellate purposes. A defendant is entitled to post-conviction
relief in a situation in which the defendant raised errors which were not
found to be reversible in his original appeal, although the very same errors
were found reversible in the co-defendant's later appeal by a different
appellate panel of the same court.29 9 Post-conviction relief is necessary
in order to avoid "diametrically opposite results [which] are 'manifestly
unjust, unfair and confound our search for uniformity.""'3 "
Coram nobis, as an extraordinary writ, is rarely utilized. Its use is
limited to cases in which a defendant is no longer in custody on the
sentence which is collaterally attacked.3 ' The procedure for obtaining the
writ is somewhat non-traditional. A petition for writ of error coram nobis
relief is authorized, where both defendants were equally culpable and the evidence would
enable the defendants to be treated similarly. Id. at 468-69.
296. Jones, 591 So. 2d at 915 (emphasis added).
297. Young v. State, 604 So. 2d 925, 926 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
298. Young v. State, 608 So. 2d 111-13 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
299. Wright v. State, 604 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
300. Id. at 1249 (citing Bourgault v. State, 515 So. 2d 1287 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1987)); Joseph v. State, 447 So. 2d 243 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983), review denied, 447 So.
2d 888 (Fla. 1984).
301. Richardson v. State, 546 So. 2d 1037, 1039 (Fla. 1989).
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must be filed in the original trial court if no appeal has been taken from the
judgment and sentence sought to be vacated; otherwise, the petition must be
filed with the appellate court which affirmed the conviction.3 °2  The
purpose of the writ of error coram nobis "is to correct fundamental errors
of fact," as opposed to errors of law.303 Because the coram nobis remedy
is designed to correct a miscarriage of justice, no express time limitation
exists to bar the filing of the petition.30 4 The passage of time between the
conviction and the filing of a petition for writ of error coram nobis, standing
alone, does not constitute the prejudice necessary to support a finding of
laches as a reason for denying consideration of the writ.3"5 In the appro-
priate case, the writ of error coram nobis can be a useful and extremely
potent tool for obtaining relief.
X. CONCLUSION
The Florida courts continue to chart out new territory in deciding
criminal cases. This year, in a special effort to bring solutions to the ever
growing crime problem, the Florida Legislature made the criminal justice
system the focus of its attention. Rather than press a meaningless "tough
on crime" approach, the Legislature addressed the principal cause of
problems in the criminal justice system-a lack of funding-and prioritized
the use of resources. The result is one of the most comprehensive and
sweeping revisions of sentencing law and corrections policy. The courts and
lawyers will be busy applying the new laws and resolving new problems.
The courts have not and cannot solve all the persistent issues which
plague the system, but the Florida Supreme Court has used this past year as
an opportunity to provide leadership and guidance to the courts and to
litigants. The Florida courts continue on the path of using common sense
and reason to safeguard individual rights and promote fairness to every
participant in the criminal justice system. Litigants should recognize that
fine line when attempting to apply legal precedent and when charting new
waters.
302. State v. Woods, 400 So. 2d 456, 457 (Fla. 1981).
303. Malcolm v. State, 605 So. 2d 945, 947 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1992).
304. Id. at 949.
305. Id.
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